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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the potential causes of the subprime loan crisis and discusses its impact
in the United States. The root causes of the crisis include unethical practices by brokers and
lenders, a lack of corrective action by credit rating agencies, lax regulation by the Federal
Government of independent mortgage companies and the role of Wall Street. First, I examine
the lax lending practices over this time period by comparing the performance of mortgage
pools by three well known high-priced lenders over a two year period (2005 – 2006). I find
strong evidence of poorer underwriting in the latter year. Second, using the 2006 Home
Mortgage Disclosure Data (HMDA), I further analyze the lending patterns and the prevalence
of higher-priced loans in New England to assess the extent of potential problems. I find that in
2006 African Americans and Hispanics were significantly more likely to get a higher cost
loan compared to white individuals in New England despite similar income and loan
amounts. Finally, I conclude by summarizing existing flaws in the system and proposing
some solutions to help better educate mortgage consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade the United States mortgage market has been transformed by the boom in
subprime lending activity. Home prices skyrocketed as the Federal Reserve kept interest rates
low and credit became easily available to borrowers by mortgage companies looking to
originate and securitize loans in order to satisfy riskier appetites of mortgage backed security
investors. The democratization of credit, due to lower rates and looser underwriting, led to an
increase in demand for home loans as the opportunity to own a nicer home became available
to those who could not previously afford one.
Figure 1 shows that subprime lending was a major driver in the increase in homeownership
between 2001 and 2005. The subprime lending boom included a big increase in the number of
no or low documentation loans, which rose from 18 percent in 2001 to 49 percent in 2006 and
increasing average loan-to-value ratios accepted by lenders. The lax upfront financial
commitment to these loans attracted an increasing number of borrowers obtaining higherpriced, no or low documentation loans in order to afford the dream house they have always
wanted. A segment of the subprime loan expansion, however, included “predatory loans”
originated by brokers, who took advantage of the loose lending terms and the borrowers’ lack
of knowledge of loan stipulations in order to secure higher sales compensation and fit
borrowers with unsuitable loans.
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Figure 1 – Subprime lending from 1998 – 2006
The initial growth and leniency in underwriting subprime loans was not a problem at first
because homeowners could easily refinance their teaser loans as home prices were reaching
historic highs, which resulted in an equity cushion for lenders. Presently, as home prices
continue to decline, however, borrowers face delinquencies and foreclosures as refinancing or
selling their home at a profit is no longer a viable option. Investors of mortgage backed
securities are also under stress.
Subprime lenders, mortgage brokers, federal and state regulators, homeowners and even
consumers are all coming under fire as a result of the collapse of the mortgage industry. Not
only are people losing their homes in foreclosures, but credit availability has been tightened in
an attempt by lenders to minimize their damages. Investors have lost their appetite for
mortgage backed instruments due to increased credit risk and lack of liquidity.
The government is scrambling to find ways to minimize, fix and eventually reverse this
problem in fear of a trickle down effect of the mortgage market into the economy. The
Federal government’s recommendations reflect the consensus of the Working Group, which
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includes the heads of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(Paletta).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, I review the existing
literature on subprime lending. This section analyzes the contributing factors to the crisis
including the role of the Fed, credit rating agencies, lenders, and flaws in the securitization
process as well as examining some of the proposed solutions. In section III, I compare the
performance of six total mortgage pools securitized by Countrywide, New Century and
Ameriquest across two vintage years (2005 and 2006) to assess if there was a decline in
underwriting over this time period. In section IV, I describe the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (hereafter, HMDA) data employed in this study. I provide descriptive information on the
prevalence of higher cost lending in the New England states during 2006. This analysis sheds
light on potential discriminatory and possible predatory lending in New England. In section
V, using multivariate logistic regression, I analyze the characteristics of borrowers more
likely to obtain a higher cost loan. Finally, in section VI, I provide conclusions and policy
implications.

LITERATURE REVIEW
What is Subprime?
Borrowers obtaining a subprime loan to purchase a home typically have a poor or blemished
credit history. They are considered a higher credit risk to lenders because of their questionable
credit history.
Considering the lack of a universal definition of subprime lending, the Federal Bank issued
the 2001 Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, which defines the
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subprime borrower as one who generally displays one or more of the following credit risk
characteristics:
•

Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more 60-day
delinquencies in the last 24 month;

•

Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months;

•

Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;

•

Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit bureau risk
score (FICO) of 660 of below (depending on the product/collateral), or other bureau or
proprietary scores with an equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or,

•

Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater; or, otherwise limited ability to
cover family living expenses after deducting total debt-service requirements from
monthly income (Ashcraft & Schuermann)

Borrower FICO scores are typically used to segment borrowers into three distinct risk
classifications: prime, Alt-A, and subprime. Prime borrowers are in good credit standing,
usually with a credit score of 720 or higher. Prime borrowers typically make a down payment
and are willing to document their income and therefore are rewarded with a lower rate. Alt-A
is a category for borrowers with a credit score between 620 and 720. It is known as a “catchall” category which includes many nontraditional loans such as option adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMS) and mortgages that carry little, if any, documentation of income or assets.
Subprime loans are made to those individuals who have weak credit or excessive debt in
relation to their normal income.
Securitization of Subprime
Until the 1980s, home owners traditionally financed their homes with fixed-rate mortgages
from banks and thrifts. The banks financed the loans through low-cost federally insured
deposits and typically retained these mortgages on their books. Commercial banks are closely
overseen by federal and state banking regulators whose sole purpose is to ensure bank safety
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and soundness to protect the deposit insurance from reckless lending (Ip & Paletta). As access
to non-depository sources for residential mortgages expanded and a private label (non-GSE)
secondary mortgage market was created, there was a rapid growth of independent mortgage
companies offering subprime loans (Apgar, Bendimerad & Essene). Figure 2 shows the
significant increase in the amount subprime mortgages as a percentage of all mortgages
between 2003 and 2006.

Figure 2 – Subprime share of mortgage originations 1998 - 2006

The rapid growth of these secondary market players has been matched by an equally dramatic
consolidation of mortgage banking organizations. In 1990, the top 25 mortgage lenders
accounted for 28.4 percent of the total home mortgages with a volume of less than $500
billion. In 2005, the top 25 lenders accounted for 85 percent of the 3.1 trillion dollar mortgage
market (Apgar, Bendimerad & Essene). Since there was only a handful of lenders that
dominated all mortgage originations in the United States, borrowers were led to believe that
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because of the pure size and of a popularity of a company, their lending practices must be a
safe option.
Until fairly recently, the origination of mortgages and issuance of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) were dominated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to underwriting standards set
by the government sponsored agencies (GSEs) (Ashcraft & Schuermann). The addition of
nontraditional mortgage companies in the past twenty years has caused a bulk of MBSs to
shift from prime mortgages to subprime mortgages as investor appetites grew hungry for
riskier investments for hedge and pension funds. Figure 3 shows that 14 of the top 25
originators of subprime or Alt-A loans in 2006 were independent mortgage lenders, which
accounted for 44 percent of the total dollar volume of subprime originations. The other 54
percent of subprime loans were originated by banks, thrifts and their subsidiaries.

Figure 3 – Top 25 subprime originators in 2006
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The Federal government has little effective control over the nontraditional mortgage
companies. With home prices reaching the highest levels in over ten years, as shown in figure
4, there was an increased demand for more affordable loans. Between lax government
regulation and an increased demand for subprime loans, companies began to specialize in
subprime mortgages instead of offering them as part of a menu of products. With independent
companies having virtually limitless origination capabilities, subprime mortgages began to
flood the housing market.

National Home Prices 1989-2007
CME Case Shiller Home Price Index
(U.S. Composite)
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Figure 4 – National home prices from 1989 - 2007
A reduction in long-term interest rates through the end of 2003 caused a sharp increase in the
amount of loan originations in all segments; subprime, Alt-A, jumbo and agency. Figure 5
shows that interest rate were declining since 2000, eventually hitting the lowest point since
1970.
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Figure 5 – Mortgage rate movement
Figure 6 shows that while the agency loan originations peaked in 2003, the non-agency
segments (subprime, Alt-A and jumbo) continued to grow rapidly until 2005. One particular
trend to notice is the increasing percentage of subprime loans issued between 2001 and 2005
(Ashcraft & Schuermann).
The amount of subprime loan originations increased three-fold between 2001 and 2006. More
significantly, however, is the increasing percentage of subprime loans issued into pools to be
securitized. Figure 6 shows that in 2001, 46 percent of all subprime loans originated were
pooled into MBSs, compared to 74 percent in 2005 and 75 percent in 2006, respectively. This
is important because when lenders securitize loans they get rid of the risk (credit and interest
rate risk) while generating fees based incomes. To have such a dramatic increase in
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originations within a relatively short time period shows that companies were concentrating
their efforts towards the quantity of loans securitized rather than focusing on the ability of the
borrowers to afford the payments.

Source: Inside Mortgage Finance (2007).
Notes: Jumbo origination includes non-agency prime. Agency origination includes conventional/conforming and FHA/VA loans. Agency
issuance GNMA, FHLMC, and FNMA. Figures are in billions of USD.

Figure 6 – Mortgage originations/issuance from 2001 – 2006
There are numerous fundamental problems embedded in the process of securitizing
mortgages. Predatory lending, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and principal-agent
relationships are difficult to control and monitor because of the complexity of human behavior
and self-interest of the players, which is innately tied into the process.
Predatory lending has been a major, and possibly the largest contributor to the current
subprime crisis. Predatory lending occurs when the originator of a loan, or a broker working
on behalf of the originator, suggests a loan to a borrower, knowing that they will not be able
to afford the payments as the mortgage matures and the interest rate changes. Often times the
borrower is unsophisticated and unaware of all of the loan stipulations or other options they
may have to finance a home due to the complex nature of the mortgage process. In an attempt
to receive higher sales compensation, brokers may try to place mortgages with borrowers at
higher prices than the borrower can realistically afford or alternatively steer them into a less
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suitable product if it generates higher fees. Under the notion, “let the buyer beware,”
overcharging a borrower is generally legal (Apgar, Bendimerad & Essene). Borrowers
commonly have a false sense of security because they believe that a broker or loan originator
is acting in their best interest and would not take advantage of them. Standards often tend to
be tougher for borrowers purchasing investment properties, since the loans are considered
riskier, but brokers and agents were willing to take that gamble or at least tolerate the risk in
order to make more money on the sale (Simon & Corkery). Originators are also looking to
write as many loans as possible in order to pool them together and sell them off to investment
institutions. Profit driven motivation made lenders focus on the quantity of loans rather than
the quality since this is how they made money. Underwriting standards for originators
declined as they took on more loans regardless of risk, in an attempt to fatten their bottom
line.
A pool of mortgages is usually purchased from a loan originator by a financial institution, also
known as an arranger. The arranger must conduct due diligence on the originator such as
checking financial statements, underwriting guidelines, discussing with management and
checking backgrounds in order to accurately assess the risk and quality of the mortgages
(Ashcraft & Schuermann). An underlying problem in this process is asymmetric information.
This occurs when one party has more information about the mortgages and borrowers than the
other party or parties involved. When an arranger purchases the mortgages from the
originator, they are often unaware of the quality of loans they are buying if the proper
research is not adequately performed. A substantial percentage of the loans purchased by
arrangers have been of poor quality because of predatory lending and loosened underwriting
standards by brokers and lenders.
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After an arranger purchases a pool of loans, they typically sell the pool to a bankruptcyremote trust. This trust protects investors against the possibility of the arranger or originator
going bankrupt. Again, asymmetric information problem exists. The arranger or the asset
manager employed on behalf of the arranger has more information about the mortgages than
does the ultimate investor. The arrangers have the ability to “cherry pick” - securitize bad
loans and keep the good ones or securitize them somewhere else; this process is called
adverse selection (Ashcraft & Schuermann).
Asymmetric information affects the relationship between an investor and their agent, or
investment manager, who is aiding them in their investment strategy, which is also known as
the principal-agent problem. Similar to predatory lending, an investor can be unsophisticated
and unaware of how to formulate an investment strategy. In order to achieve higher
compensation and fees, once again, the manager may suggest riskier or expensive products
that are not suitable for the investor’s needs or desires.
Interactions and exchanges during the securitization process of subprime mortgage-backed
securities are loosely regulated. Currently, the system is fundamentally flawed because of the
complexity of judging human behavior. For example, whether or not a broker, underwriter, or
investment agent is truly acting in the borrower’s or in the investor’s best interest, or are
simply trying to secure higher fee-based compensation? Before subprime lending became
popular, such a problem was minimal because prime mortgage-backed securities carried little
risk because a borrower’s ability to make payments on a conventional mortgage. Mortgages
were generally plain vanilla products with easily estimated cash flows. Now, with the
possibility for so many people to profit from the securitization of subprime loans, unsuitable
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and unethical practices have become common place in the industry because of increased
uncertainty about borrowers’ ability to make the appropriate payments.
Borrowers are not the only ones feeling the negative effects of the built-in inadequacies of
subprime mortgage securitization in recent years; the loan originators and ultimately the
investors have also been victimized. Mortgage companies are continuing to have their
reputations destroyed as the subprime crisis unfolds.
According to www.thetruthaboutmortgage.com, as of February 7, 2008, there are
approximately 485 U.S. mortgage companies that have closed, merged, been bought out, or
had a significant number of layoffs due to the crisis. Such companies include Wells Fargo,
Washington Mutual, Wachovia, New Century, Citigroup, and Countrywide.
New Century Financial Corporation was once the nation’s largest subprime mortgage lender
and real estate investment trust (REIT). After getting too caught up in a wave of defaults
brought on by the 2006 housing bust, New Century stopped making loans and was forced to
file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The SEC believes that the company had lost track of
borrowers who missed mortgage payments causing a surge in their portfolios by not taking
defaults into account (Hoovers).
Countrywide Financial Corp, one of the largest mortgage originators in the United States, was
recently bought out by Bank of America for $4 billion in an all-stock deal. Countrywide’s fall
and rescue is just one example of the far-reaching effects of the subprime crisis. A
Countrywide failure posed a huge risk to the U.S. economy since they service approximately
one in every six loans in the country. The company finds itself in this situation because of
their aggressive push of adjustable-rate-mortgages (ARMs) during the housing boom in recent
years and their exposure to past subprime and risky mortgages (Paletta, Bauerlein & Hagerty).
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On Sunday March 15, 2008 Bear Stearns sold to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co at $2 a share in
stock, or about $236 million. Bear was pushed to the brink of collapse by the mortgage crisis
and caused the Fed to take swift action in fear of a potential collapse of a major Wall Street
institution for the first time in a decade. It is believed that the concerted efforts of Wall Street
and Washington can head off a recession (Sidel, Berman & Kelly). The major concern with a
potential Bear collapse was the degree to which the other major financial institutions are
intertwined between loans, credit lines, derivatives and swaps (Kelly, Ip & Sidel). Realizing
the seriousness of the situation, for the first time since the Great Depression, the Federal
Reserve supplied a nonbank with funds in order to secure a take over. Specifically, the Fed
supplied J.P. Morgan with $30 billion in exchange for hard-to-trade securities on Bear’s
books in which the government took upon the risk of both profit and loss. Although taxpayers
could ultimately be on the hook for losses, the political response has been fairly positive
(despite concerns of mortal hazard) as it shows true concern about the crisis from the
government aside from cutting interest rates.
Investors in mortgage backed securities are also subject to the effects of the crisis. The sale of
securitized loans by Wall Street was originally intended to distribute risk broadly. The ease of
buying complex securities with the eventual owner having no true idea of the actual risk may
have been a virus that started to cause the crisis to unfold into the market. With delinquencies
and foreclosures on the rise with no end in sight, the investments that the mortgages were tied
to are performing poorly, (including the good ones due to lack of liquidity) causing investors
to lose a substantial amount of money. Angry investors have also been forcing originators to
buy back dud loans, which aids the closure of several smaller subprime lenders (Hagerty &
Simon).
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The public has grown weary as they learn of the reckless lending techniques that have been
applied by companies to uneducated borrowers in recent years. The financial institutions and
investors purchasing these MBSs have also taken a hit. Initially, financial institutions bought
up pools of MBSs in order to diversify risk more broadly. The final owner of the investment,
however, often had no idea what his or her investment was actually worth or how much risk
he or she carried because of inadequate or unreliable information.
Credit Rating Agencies
The three major credit rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch have also
been major contributors to the subprime crisis. These rating firms have come under fire for
giving overly favorable ratings to MBSs and for being slow to downgrade them (Scannell &
Solomon). A credit rating agency (CRA) has the responsibility of assessing an obligor’s
creditworthiness in order for investors to get a better feel of the level of credit or default risk
(Ashcraft & Schuermann). Rating companies often differ in their strategies for assessing the
riskiness of MBSs issued by financial institutions. Some companies, such as Fitch and
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), focus on the obligor’s overall capacity to meet its financial
obligations and use the probability of default as a rating device, while other companies such
as Moody’s concentrate on an obligor’s ability to recover funds in the event of a loss
(Ashcraft & Schuermann).
A confusing aspect in the credit rating arena is the difference between a corporate bond
obligator rating versus that of asset-backed securities (ABS). For a corporate bond rating,
CRAs concentrate on firm-specific risk, which is simply the overall financial strength and
integrity of the company. For ABSs, the rating is based off the cash flows from a portfolio of
underlying assets and is, therefore, rated based of systematic risk in the market, such as

- 15 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)
economic conditions (Ashcraft & Schuermann). As economic conditions deteriorate, it is the
responsibility of the CRA to adjust its ratings accordingly by increasing the amount of needed
credit to keep the ratings as accurate as possible.
Although CRAs did downgrade MBSs, they did not do so in relation to economic signs as
they occurred. For example, in June 2007 S&P finally started to downgrade a portion of the
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The company put 612 classes of RMBS on
CreditWatch with negative implications. The total value of securities affected was
approximately $12.078 billion, which represented 2.13% of the $565.3 billion in U.S. RMBS
rated by S&P between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2006. S&P reported
that a significant number of securities showed evidence of delinquency, default, and loss trend
lines that are indicative to a weak future credit performance (Standard & Poor’s). In the same
week, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded 399 securities backed by first-lien subprime
mortgage loans with an original face value of more than $5.2 billion. Sixty percent of the
securities were backed by loans from Fremont Investment & Loan, Long Beach Mortgage
Co., New Century Mortgage Corp, and WMC Mortgage Corp. Fitch Ratings also downgraded
170 securities backed by subprime mortgages valued at $7.1 billion (www.inman.com). Even
within one week it became apparent that CRAs were realizing that they gave too favorable
ratings to subprime MBSs. If the credit rating agencies had done a more adequate job in
assessing the risk of these securities, such sudden and abrupt downgrades of such significant
values would have not occurred.
CRAs are receiving the bulk of the blame for the subprime crisis for not responding fast
enough to reevaluate the risk of these investments when there were signs that housing
delinquencies and foreclosures were rising. McGraw Hill, the parent company of S&P, argues
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that the, “key point is those securities that have been impacted the most are those that were
originally told the market carried a higher level of risk. When we saw loosened underwriting
standards and started to see the poor performance of individual loans, we adjusted our rating
criteria and required issuers of riskier subprime mortgages to add collateral enhancement to
the details” (Scannell & Solomon). Others defending the CRAs reiterate that rating is both an
art and a science due to level of interpretation of economic conditions that is necessary. Still,
many believe the CRAs were slow to respond in reevaluating the risk carried with the
subprime mortgage securities, which caused investors to be unaware of the real risk
associated with their purchases.
The fundamental problems of subprime securitization and the shortcomings of CRAs played a
leading role in the subprime crisis. In short, the riskier appetites of MBSs investors led to a
surge of subprime lending in the United States. With originators offering generous lines of
credit for home loans to uneducated borrowers, the word spread that everybody could afford
big beautiful homes, or even second and third homes, with virtually no money down and no
evidence of income. As the loans reached rate reset dates, more and more people realized they
had dug themselves into a hole with no escape. With delinquencies and foreclosures on the
rise, the securities they were tied into started to perform poorly. The United States finds itself
in a situation where millions of people have lost or are in danger of losing their homes and the
economic impact of the mortgage market could be a frontrunner into a recession in the near
future.
The Unfolding Crisis
Foreclosures occur when people cannot afford to make the necessary payments, often
accompanied with insufficient equity to cure the default by selling the home. Foreclosure
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rates have a natural flow dependent on economic and housing market conditions. Rapid
increases in foreclosure rates are typically rare events. Poor economic conditions, such as
recession and the accompanying higher unemployment rates and lower and personal income,
often cause people to default on their mortgage payments (Edmiston & Zalneraitis).
Another problem with a majority of subprime loans is that they are ARMs – adjustable rate
mortgages that typically have a low “teaser rate,” which are repriced as the loan seasons. As
the rates on these loans reset and increase, borrowers experience payment shock and are
suddenly unable to afford the inflated payments. They are lured into the loan because of
appealing low interest rate, but they do not take into consideration that the rate will eventually
increase. With the opportunity to afford their dream home many borrowers chose to ignore the
eventual rate increase, ultimately leading to increased foreclosures and delinquencies.
Figure 7 provides an example of borrower payment shock. With the low introductory teaser
rate, the borrower’s monthly payment was $1,966 with a post tax debt-to-income of 61
percent. Even assuming no change in market interest rate, when rate is fully indexed the
payment soars to $2,921 with a post tax debt-to-income of 90 percent. With monthly
payments making huge increases in such a short period of time, it is apparent why more and
more borrowers cannot keep up with their mortgage payments.
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Figure 7 – Payment shock
Figure 8 shows the foreclosures between the second quarters of 2005 and 2007. Subprime
foreclosures grew at a significantly higher rate compared to government-insured and prime
loans.

Figure 8 – Foreclosure start rates from 2005 – 2007
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Figure 9 shows that subprime loans accounted for nearly 54 percent of all foreclosures in the
United States by the end of 2006, while only comprising 20 percent of all originations. Again,
the majority of this increase can be attributed to increasing number of independent mortgage
companies with generous credit availability, loose lending terms and declining underwriting
standards.

Figure 9 – Subprime share of foreclosures in 2006
Figure 10 gives an illustrative summary of prime vs. subprime defaults and foreclosures in
2006. Subprime loans have a significantly higher percentage of defaults and foreclosures
compared to prime mortgages. Subprime defaults increased 65.4 percent while prime loan
defaults accounted for 34.6 percent of defaults. Foreclosures on subprime increased 70.7
percent and prime accounted for 29.3 percent.

- 20 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)

Figure 10 – Prime and subprime portions of default and foreclosure in 2006
Figure 11 shows a map of the United States as well as a bar graph of the percentage change in
foreclosure rates between 2005 and 2007. The white states on the map have a less than 10
percent or no change in foreclosure rates, the light gray states had between a 10 percent and
50 percent increase, the dark gray states had a 50 percent to 100 percent increase, and the
black states had more than a 100 percent increase. The states hardest hit with increased
foreclosure start rates include Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
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Figure 11 – Percentage foreclosure start rate for each state from 2005 - 2007

When subprime lending became a popular option for borrowers to obtain a loan,
delinquencies remained relatively low because home prices were on the rise, which made
refinancing or selling at a profit a reasonable and realistic option if mortgage payments
became too burdensome to the homeowner. As home prices peaked in most markets in 2006,
however, refinancing was no longer a realistic escape; therefore, homeowners who obtained
subprime financing started to fall behind on payments, resulting in increasing foreclosures
(Timiroas).
Figure 12 shows the dramatic annual increase in the percent of adjustable subprime mortgage
delinquencies between the third quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2007. Fixed rate
subprime loans remained relatively steady as did prime fixed and prime adjustable rate
mortgages.

- 22 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)

Figure 12 – Increase in delinquency rates
As a result of increasing delinquencies and foreclosures, mortgage lenders are shutting their
doors to many borrowers looking to obtain subprime loans. Lenders have begun raising rates
and eliminating no-money down loans for subprime borrowers and are now adamant in seeing
evidence of income. With fewer borrowers having the ability to afford a home in the
aftermath of this crisis, demand for homes will decrease causing home prices to also decline
(Laperriere).
Proposed Solutions
The Federal government is continuing to search for ways to stop the bleeding and contain or
limit the subprime crisis. As of the first few months in 2008, the Fed has been forced into
action. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has been making leads in order
to improve the current situation. Recommendations include strengthening the state and federal
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oversight of mortgage lenders and brokers, implementing strong nationwide licensing
standards for mortgage brokers, directing credit-rating firms and regulators to differentiate
between ratings on complex structured products and conventional bonds, encouraging rating
firms to disclose conflicts of interest and details of their reviews, and pushing issuers of
mortgage-backed securities to disclose more about the level and scope of due diligence and to
call for financial institutions – not only banks but also government-sponsored mortgage giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – to raise more capital and to revisit dividend policies (Paletta).
It is difficult to come up with a concrete course of action considering that the far reaching
effects of this crisis are yet to be realized. Home prices continue on a steady decline and
delinquencies and foreclosure rates are predicted to increase in the years to come. As shown
in the figure 13, when home prices decrease dramatically, it has more often than not been a
predecessor to a recession.

Figure 13 – Relationship between home prices and recession
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Much of the discussion to this point has been to improve existing regulations concerning best
practices and standards of the industry. A majority of the focus has been on broker licensing
and monitoring, SEC regulations, the role of government sponsored entities (GSEs), and
extending the reach industry regulations such as the Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risk (Guidance).
In April 2007, Senator Charles Schumer called for a government “bailout,” which would cost
“hundreds of millions.” Lawmakers declined to outline how the proposed bailout would
actually work, but it was reported the bailout would cost lenders and local governments about
$80,000 per foreclosure. They, however, did say a bailout is just a part of a multipronged
strategy that includes pushing for anti-predatory lending legislation and for a bill creating
federal standards for mortgage brokers (Kaper).
Congress is looking into mortgage lending practices due to pressure from consumer groups
who want to impose suitability standards on lenders. The Mortgage Banking Association is
working on voluntary disclosure standards for its members in an effort to make it easier for
borrowers to understand the pros and cons of various loans (Simon).
Federal legislators are attempting to make investors of mortgages more responsible for their
actions by eliminating or modifying existing legislation that limits investor liability. Such
actions are done in hopes of making investors more aware of the risk they are taking on when
investing in subprime mortgage-backed securities (Apgar, Bendimerad & Essene).
President Bush asked Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, head of the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets, to look into ratings firms. The working group consists of
Treasury, the Fed, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The group will
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also be looking into how “securitization and the repackaging and selling of assets have
changed the mortgage industry and related business practices” (Scannell & Solomon).
A recent proposal from the Bush Administration called for six of the nation’s largest financial
institutions to contact homeowners who are ninety or more days past overdue and give them
the opportunity to put the foreclosure process off for thirty days while they work out ways to
make their mortgage more affordable. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson believes it will give
borrowers valuable time to work out refinancing terms, but lenders would not be required to
offer any more favorable financing terms that they are already offering. Critics, such as AFLCIO President John Sweeney, believe much more assistance will be needed to prevent the
foreclosure tidal wave that is closing in on the United States in the next two years. Sweeney
said, “A month long moratorium on mortgage foreclosure is like a Band-Aid when the patient
really needs surgery” (Crutsinger).
In addition to working with consumer groups, Congress is debating a series of governmentsponsored entities (GSE) reform measures in hopes of the GSEs taking on a more active role
in the acquisition of subprime loans. Congress hopes that the GSEs will establish a series of
industry best practices that would govern the subprime mortgage-backed securities portion of
the industry. Congress believes that because of the extensive regulatory rules already
governing GSEs, they could be an example of how other secondary market participants
should run in order to promote safety and soundness within the industry (Apgar, Bendimerad
& Essene). On March 19, 2008 Federal regulators affirmed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
will enjoy loosened capital requirements, allowing them to pile more mortgage securities onto
their balance sheets. Both could purchase an additional $200 billion in mortgage securities,
equivalent to about 10 percent of expected U.S. home-mortgage lending in 2008 (Paletta &
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Hagerty). The move was made in hopes of keeping interest rates low for home buyers.
Congress is also allowing Fannie and Freddie to buy mortgages up to $729,750 – depending
on the region of the country – through the end of the year. This allowance was intended to
reduce the gap between rates on jumbo and conforming loans by creating a category of what
some are calling “superconforming” loans (Opdyke).
Despite self denied shortcomings of CRAs, representatives from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch
have agreed to work with lawmakers and regulators in hope of cleaning up the mess and
preventing a similar crisis from reoccurring. For example, Moody’s is considering major
changes in how it rates mortgage-related bonds and other securities. These possible changes
include creating labels that would make it easier for investors to understand the differences
between structured finance investments such as collateralized debt obligations and corporate
bonds from Treasury securities. Moody’s is also considering a 21-point numerical scale to
rate structure securities rather than assigning letter grades. All efforts are directed at making
their ratings easily understandable for investors (Lucchetti). McGraw-Hill Cos. is also making
changes for the better. S&P announced on February 7, 2008 that they will rotate lead rating
analysts after five years to follow the same company, government bond issuer, or structuredfinance arranger. This new practice is aimed at preventing professional or personal
relationships from affecting ratings. Rating analysts will also be required to undergo more
training, adding additional surveillance tools to track structured-finance performance, and an
audit or governance expert will be brought in to review processes (Lucchetti).
Documents such as the Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks
(Guidance) issued in 2006 were designed to promote safety and soundness of market
participants, specifically deposit-taking institutions, loan officers, and mortgage brokers. The
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Guidance was created by the “Agencies” (OCC, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
FDIC, OTS and NCUA), with the intent to clarify how institutions can offer nontraditional
mortgage products in a safe and sound manner that would clearly disclose all the risks
associated with loans that borrowers might assume. Since the guidance provides suggestions,
which is distinct from regulations, most members involved in the origination and
securitization of nontraditional loans often ignore them. Extending the reach of the Guidance
would offer better consumer protection and limit the potential adverse consequences arising
from the differences across market participants, which create the competitive dynamics of the
mortgage industry. As of February 2007, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS)
and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) have
announced that twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have agreed to work to adopt
the Guidance and to make state regulated non-bank and mortgage brokers subject to the same
best practices that now only apply to federally-regulated entities (Apgar, Bendimerad &
Essene). Although this will be a lengthy process, the long term effects would be substantial in
beginning to turn this subprime crisis around.
On March 11, 2008 the Federal Government took a major step in the right direction by
providing liquidity and stability into the financial market. Government officials made a
promise to lend up to $200 billion in Treasury bonds to invest in Wall Street firms for 28
days. In return, the Treasury would obtain mortgage-backed securities whose uncertain values
played a role in sparking the current crisis. The first swap is scheduled for March 27 (Sidel,
Ip, Phillips & Kelly).
One obstacle standing in the way of proposed solutions is the underlying belief, mainly by the
Bush administration, that too much regulation would stifle credit for low-income families,
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capital markets and well-educated consumers. Taxpayers, however, are angered by proposed
solutions such as government bailouts since higher taxes will be necessary to fix the mistakes
made by uneducated buyers and reckless practices by lenders. Opposition to the elimination,
modification, and creation of new regulations and legislation will only dig a deeper hole and
make it more difficult to enact concrete solutions in order to turn this crisis around and
prevent it from reoccurring.
The future is uncertain for the mortgage industry. Some analysts believe that the crisis will be
over within a year or two while others believe that it will take much longer. Although the
development of this crisis is now well documented, it is still an unknown if the worst is
behind us. Standard & Poor’s recently downgraded or threatened to downgrade more than
8,000 mortgage investments and projected that a wide array of financial institutions could
ultimately face losses up to $265 billion dollars. Analysts say total losses could eventually
reach upwards of $400 billion. It is estimated that by the end of 2008, national home-price
declines could reach 13 percent and that the housing market would not bottom out until 2009
(Lucchetti & Ng). As of early February 2008, more than 30 percent of borrowers with
subprime or Alt-A, who represent 365,000 of the l.1 million delinquent loans – are already at
least 30 days past due even though they have not yet faced their first reset date. One report
claims that nearly 45 percent of the subprime and Alt-A loans that will not reset until the
fourth quarter of 2008 are currently at least 30 days delinquent (Simon). Foreclosures create a
ripple effect in neighborhoods, pushing down prices and making it tougher for people who
live in those communities to refinance or sell their homes if they cannot make their mortgage
payments (Simon & Corkery). It appears that in order for this crisis to be turned around, the
situation will get worse before it gets any better. New legislation and regulation will not
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create immediate solutions. The only way for this crisis to cease is to let it play out to the end
while creating a foundation to help rebuild the industry as soon it stabilizes.

HIGH-PRICED MORTGAGE POOL COMPARISONS
Considering the significant increase in the number of high-cost loans since 2001, in this
section I examine borrower performance trends over the 2005-2006 time period for three
major subprime lenders to assess whether there was a weakening of underwriting at three
different securitizers, as well as to assess the relative performance across two corresponding
years.
I examine the loan performance of three major subprime lenders: Countrywide, New Century
and Ameriquest. This analysis includes two loan pools from each lender – one in 2005 and
one from 2006. The representative pools names and assigned graph reference names are as
follows:
•

Countrywide 2005-bc2 (CW 05)

•

Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC10 (CW 06)

•

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3 (NC 05)

•

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1 (NC 06)

•

Asset-Backed-Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-R6 (AQ 05)

•

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R2 (AQ 06)

All available pool information was obtained from each company’s respective prospectus.

- 30 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)
All pools have an average FICO score below 660, which is one characteristic of a subprime
loan. It is immediately understood that the mortgages in all pools are significantly riskier
because of their average FICO score. For all pools considered, the average LTV ratios are all
in the high seventies and low eighties range. This means that on average, borrowers were able
to make a down payment of around 20 percent on the loan. Interestingly enough, investors
taking the LTV ratio into consideration may consider the mortgages as a relatively safe
investment. Despite having an average LTV ratio in the high seventies and low eighties, the
ratios ranged from as low as 8.65% to 100%. These lower LTV ratios were outliers that may
have resulted for the entire pools performance to suffer despite having a relatively safe LTV
ratio. As it turns out, the originator pools performed poorly and actually declined over the
2005 to 2006 time period.
Both Countrywide and New Century experienced increases in 30 day delinquency balances
from their respective pools from 2005 to 2006. In general, the percentage increases at the
three, six, nine and twelve month points show substantial growth in 30 day delinquencies
when examining the 2005-2006 cohorts. The only exception to this trend was Ameriquest.
From 2005 to 2006 the percentage of 30 day delinquent mortgages actually decreased at the
three and six month points. The nine and twelve month points showed an increase in
delinquencies from on year to the other (Appendix C). The same trend continues for the 60
day delinquency balance for each company, again with the biggest differences occurring for
Countrywide (Appendix D).
The bankruptcy balance for both Countrywide and New Century increased at the twelve
month points from 2005 to 2006. The only exception was Ameriquest, which at the twelve
month point from 2005 to 2006 actually had decreased its bankruptcy balance (Appendix E).
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Both New Century and Ameriquest pools had increased net rate losses between 2005 and
2006. Most notably, New Century had a substantial increase at the twelve month point with a
0.5 percent difference (Appendix F).
All three companies experienced an increase in the percentage of their loans reaching
foreclosure from 2005 to 2006. New Century had the largest total foreclosure balance in their
pools, a telling sign of why they failed (Appendix G).
All three companies were forced to buy back failed mortgages, most notably around twelve
months after the pool was created. The rate and volume of mortgages bought back by these
lenders should have been a key indicator that they would soon, if not already, be over their
head because of reckless lending (Appendix H).
New Century’s ending pool balance decreased tremendously between 2005 and 2006.
Ameriquest also decreased as well, although not a much in comparison. Countrywide’s
ending balance actually increased between 2005 and 2006. Since Countrywide was a very
popular lender across the entire country, the geographic diversification aided their
performance. The decline of Ameriquest is reflective areas in which the company was popular
such as New England.

HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT
Given the documented poor performance of the subprime loan pools, what types of borrowers
obtained these loans? The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) is an excellent source of
this type of information. HMDA was implemented in 1975 with the intent to help the public
determine whether or not institutions were adequately serving the communities’ housing
finance needs, to facilitate the enforcement of the nation’s fair lending laws and to guide
public- and private-sectors investment activities. As of 2006, there was approximately 8,900
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lenders subject HMDA, which made up an estimated 80 percent of home lending across the
country (Avery, Brevoort & Canner).
From the beginning, HMDA disclosures were limited to summary totals which covered types
of loans for each census tract, but included no information on pricing or applications which
were denied. In 2002, the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation C and increased the type
and amount of public information available from the HMDA reports beginning in 2004. The
most significant change was the requirement that lenders must identify and disclose
information about APRs above set thresholds, or “high-priced loans” (Avery, Brevoort &
Canner). Other improvements included disclosure of lien status and whether the loan is
secured by a manufactured home or subject to protection of the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act.
The recent improvements of HMDA have aided market transparency by making it fairly easy
to identify lenders who are highly active in originating higher-priced loans. As a result,
concerns have been raised about the fairness of the lending practices (Avery, Brevoort &
Canner).
In this section, I examine the prevalence of high-priced loans in New England. Specifically, I
examine over three million loan applications during 2006 and provide information on loan
amount, borrower income, and APR spread for each race and ethnicity by state. It is common
place in the mortgage industry that a borrower’s loan amount and income with is a significant
predictor to whether or not they receive a higher rate. As was the case in New England for
2006, both income and loan amount were not significant characteristics, but rather
race/ethnicity was the determining factor.
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Figure 14 shows the percentage of each race obtaining a loan within the specific loan amount
bands. On average across all races and states, 20.6 percent of all loans were under $50,000,
15.6 percent fell within the $50,000 - $100,000 range, 13 percent were between $100,000 and
$150,000, 14.9 percent between $150,000 and $200,000, 13.4 percent between $200,000 and
$250,000, 8.7 percent between $250,000 and $300,000, and 13.3 percent exceeded $300,000.
Accordingly, the three most common loan amount ranges were under $50,000, between
$50,000 and $100,000, and between $150,000 and $200,000.
In the top two most common ranges (under $50,000 and between $50,000 and $100,000),
American Indians had the largest average percentage of all races across New England to
obtain these loans with 27.3 percent and 21.09 percent respectively. Asians accounted for the
smallest percentage of all races to obtain a loan under $50,000 with a total of 17.58 percent
and Native Hawaiians accounted for the smallest percentage to attain a loan between $50,000
and $100,000 with 13.65 percent. African Americans accounted for the highest collective
percentage of individuals attaining a loan from the third most common range of between
$150,000 and $200,000 with 17.11 percent. Native Hawaiians accounted for the smallest
average percent of individuals obtaining a loan between $150,000 and $200,000 with an
average of 12.42 percent of their total population across all New England states in 2006.
There were no significant discrepancies between and borrower’s race and the loan amount.
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Figure 14 – Loan Amount for each race in 2006
Figure 15 shows the income ranges for each race across New England in 2006. The most
common income range between all races is between $50,000 and $100,000. On average,
across all six New England states, 43.03 percent of American Indians have an income
between $50,000 and $100,000, 46.54 percent of Asians, 51.66 percent of African Americans,
49.16 percent of Native Hawaiians, 46.52 percent of Whites and 51.39 percent of Hispanics.
Although African Americans and Hispanics have the largest percentage of their population
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falling within the most common range, each race has over 40 percent of their population
within the same range. Considering all races are relatively proportionate in their loan amount
and income, we can conclude that all races should have an equal opportunity in attaining a
similar APR spread.

Figure 15 – Income by race in 2006
Figure 16 shows APR rate spread breakdowns by race for each New England state in 2006.
The two most common APR ranges for all races was between 5-6.99 percent and 7-8.99
percent. The average percent of African Americans across all six New England states having a
rate spread between 5-6.99 percent was 50.12 percent. In both of the two most common
ranges, African Americans populated the highest average percentage having the APR spreads.
On the lower end of the spectrum, American Indians accounted for 44.54 percent of the 56.99 percent APR spread range and Hispanics/Latinos accounted for 14.80 percent of the 7-
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8.99 percent APR spread range. This evidence suggests that African Americans are more
likely to be victims of higher cost lending and likely predatory lending across New England in
2006.

Figure 16 – APR spread by race in New England states for 2006
Figure 17 shows the percentage of state population composition and the percentage of highpriced loans received by each race in 2006. Across every New England state for 2006, African
Americans received a majority the higher-priced loans. The biggest difference between
population compositions vs. percent receiving high-priced loans was between Whites and
African Americans, the difference being most apparent in Maine and New Hampshire
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(Appendices A & B). In Maine, African Americans made up 0.41 percent of the entire
population, yet they received 34.20 percent of all high-priced loans. Whites made up 87.02
percent of the population and received 21.29 percent of all higher-priced loans. The findings
are similar in New Hampshire. Whites comprised of 85.45 percent of the population and
received a total of 19.39 percent of high-priced loans, while African Americans made up 0.76
percent of the population and received 34.45 percent of higher-priced loans. There is clearly a
gross discrepancy between the amount of people from each race and the percentage of them
receiving higher-priced loans. With APR spread, loan amount and income being relatively
proportionate across all races in New England in 2006, African Americans, accounting for
3.34 percent of each states population, have a 18.24 percent greater chance of receiving a high
priced loan compared to whites, who on average, comprise of 81 percent of each states
population.

Figure 17 – Comparison between race population and percent of higher-priced loans
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MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Although the previous section provides useful univariate (by race, income, etc) measures on
the prevalence of high cost loans, in this section I estimate a multivariate logistic regression
using the 2006 HMDA data to assess whether or not a borrower is more likely to get a high
cost loan controlling for all these factors simultaneously. The control variables in logistic
regression were state, income level, loan amount and race/ethnicity. The sample size for the
regression was over 1.4 million observations.
To assess the impact of borrower state, the prevalence of a high cost origination in each state
was compared relative to Massachusetts (the omitted state). The results conclude that
borrowers from Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maine and New Hampshire that obtained a loan
were more likely to receive a high-priced loan relative to borrowers in Massachusetts.
Statistically, borrowers from Rhode Island are the most likely to receive a high-priced loan
with a coefficient of 0.2832 at a 95 percent confidence level and an odds ratio of 1.32:1, or a
32% chance of receiving a high-priced loan simply for being a resident of Rhode Island.
Household income level was analyzed in relation to borrowers who had an income of over
$150,000. Borrowers with an income between $50,000 and $100,000 and between $100,000
and $150,000 were more likely to receive a high-priced loan. There was no significance of
borrowers with under $50,000 to be subject to high-priced loans. Those borrowers with
income between $50,000 and $100,000 were statistically the most likely to receive a highpriced loan with a coefficient of 0.5062 at a 95 percent confidence level and an odds ratio of
1.66:1, or a 66% chance of receiving a high-priced loan simply for making between $50,000
and $100,000.
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Loan amounts were analyzed in relation to loan above $417,000. All loan ranges under the
$417,000 were found to be significant, in that any borrower obtaining a loan under $417,000
was more likely to receive a high-priced loan. Statistically, the most prominent category of
borrowers to receive high-priced loans was those who obtained loans under $175,000, having
a coefficient of 0.4766 at a 95 percent confidence level and an odds ratio of 1.61:1, or a 61%
chance of receiving a high-priced loan simply for obtaining a loan under $175,000.
The most telling characteristic of borrowers to receive a high-priced loan was if they were a
minority; either African American or Hispanic/Latino. African Americans and
Hispanic/Latinos were analyzed in relation to white borrowers. Statistically, minority
borrowers were more likely to receive a high-priced loan with a coefficient of 1.2272 at a 95
percent confidence level in relation to white borrowers in addition to an odds ratio of 3.412:1,
meaning that minorities are three times as likely to receive a high-priced loan. Furthermore,
African Americans were slightly more likely to be subject to high-priced loans with a
coefficient of 1.2432 compared to Hispanics/Latinos, having a coefficient of 1.2078. These
findings are in direct opposition to Regulation B as previously discussed. The purpose of
Regulation B is to promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants without
regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex martial status or age … the regulation
prohibits creditor practices that discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. Clearly race
was a determinant as to whether a borrower obtained a high-priced loan in across New
England in 2006.
As Figure 14 shows, African Americans and Hispanics/Latinos comprise of a small
percentage of each New England states population, yet according to the regression, are more
likely to be subject to high-priced loans compared to whites, who comprised of a large

- 40 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)
percentage of each state’s population. The evidence suggests that predatory lending against
African American’s and Hispanics/Latinos occurred in New England in 2006.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Numerous factors contributed to the current subprime mortgage crisis. First, investor’s
appetites for riskier investments combine with the Fed lowering and keeping interest rates at
historical lows. Second, predatory lending loosened underwriting standards and inaction on
behalf of credit rating agencies provided fuel for reckless subprime lending to run rampant.
Currently, foreclosures and delinquencies are on the rise, lenders and investors are facing hard
times due to the weak performance of the subprime MBSs. Most importantly, however, is the
impact on borrowers of these higher priced loans.
I document the increase in risk by analyzing three major subprime lenders mortgage pool
performance over the 2005 to 2006 time period. I show that the pools originated by
Countrywide, New Century and Ameriquest performance deteriorated from 2005 to 2006.
Given the decline in credit quality, I also assess who was getting these loans. By analyzing the
HMDA data from 2006, I find African Americans were more likely to receive higher-priced
loans when compared to whites, despite African Americans comprising of a significantly
much smaller percent of the overall population in each New England state. In a multivariate
regression using the 2006 HMDA data, I conclude that race and ethnicity were the most
statistically significant characteristics of a New England borrower in obtaining a higher-price
loan.
The Federal government is contemplating solutions to minimize the impact of the crisis and to
ensure such a crisis does not reoccur. Such propositions include stricter broker licensing and
monitoring, improving SEC regulation, and increasing GSE influence. Government bailouts
- 41 -

(The Subprime Crisis: An Analysis of New England in 2006)
Senior Capstone Project for (Matthew Holt)
are unlikely as the public has voiced displeasure about using taxpayer money to fix the
mistakes of uneducated borrowers.
I believe the crisis will turn around once the market hits rock bottom. With changes in the
lending practice and all the negative publicity, borrowers will be better educated in the future
when applying for mortgages. Investors will be more careful in the future when investing in
riskier products such as mortgage backed securities and lenders will no longer originate loans
with the sole intention of securitization as they have seen the failure of multiple companies
such as New Century and Bear Stearns. Although millions have been victimized and millions
of more have yet felt the far reaching effects of this crisis, the foundation currently being
implemented by the Federal government will prevent such a disaster in the future.
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